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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Arthur Ellis Vivian appeals from the judgment of conviction entered upon his conditional
guilty plea to possession of methamphetamine. Vivian challenges the district court’s partial denial
of his motion to suppress arguing that the court erred when it did not suppress his post-Miranda1
statements.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Deputy Brott conducted a traffic stop on the car Vivian was driving because its brake lights
were not working. (R., p.80.) Vivian voluntarily disclosed to the deputy that his driver’s license
was suspended. (R., p.80.) Deputy Brott then returned to his patrol car and turned off the audio
recording feature on his on-body camera. (R., p.80.) A police officer who had stopped to assist
Deputy Brott told him that Vivian was known to be a methamphetamine user who carries drugs in
his car. (R., p.80; 9/4/19 Tr., p.24, Ls.7-24, p.34, Ls.6-12.) While awaiting returns for the routine
checks he performed, Deputy Brott requested the assistance of a canine unit. (R., p.80; 9/4/19 Tr.,
p.24, L.25 – p.26, L.6.)
After nearly eleven minutes, Deputy Brott exited his patrol car holding Vivian’s driver’s
license and a completed citation. (R., p.80; see also Ex. A, 6:06 – 16:50.) Approximately two and
a half minutes elapsed before Deputy Brott returned to Vivian’s car to issue him the completed
citation. (R., p.81.) During those two and a half minutes, Deputy Brott spoke with the two local
police officers who had stopped to assist him about whether to tow or leave Vivian’s car where it
was parked because it was in a private area that was undergoing construction. (R., p.80, n.4; 6/7/19

1

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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Tr., p.18, L.14 – p.19, L.2; 9/4/19 Tr., p.30, L.16 – p.32, L.14; see also Ex. A, 16:46 – 18:40.)
Deputy Brott also briefly spoke to the canine handler, Deputy Hickam, who had arrived on scene.
(R., p.81; 6/7/19 Tr., p.19, L.24 – p.20, L.6; 9/4/19 Tr., p.33, L.8 – p.34, L.21; see also Ex. A,
18:40 – 19:30.) The deputy then returned to Vivian’s car to issue the ticket. (R., p.81.)
The drug-detecting canine alerted to the presence of a controlled substance in Vivian’s car
as Deputy Brott was issuing Vivian the citation. (R. p.81.) Deputy Hickam searched Vivian’s car
and discovered a glass pipe as well as a baggie containing a white crystal substance that he
suspected was methamphetamine. (6/7/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.4-14.) Deputy Brott placed Vivian under
arrest. (Ex. A, 26:55 – 27:10.)
In response to questioning prior to being advised of his Miranda rights, Vivian admitted
that he used methamphetamine “a couple days ago” and that he had been using drugs for some
time. (R., p.81; Ex. A, 22:20 – 22:24, 24:40 – 25:13.) After Deputy Brott read Miranda warnings
to Vivian, he admitted “‘to paying … $60 for the substance’” and stated that “‘he believed his
fingerprints could have been on the bag.’” (R., p.81 (quoting 6/7/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.15-21).)
The state charged Vivian with possession of methamphetamine and possession of drug
paraphernalia. (R., pp.35-36.) Vivian filed a motion to suppress arguing the deputy unreasonably
extended the duration of the traffic stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment and thus all evidence
and statements obtained as a result of his unlawful seizure should be suppressed. (R., pp.49-56.)
The state objected arguing that the stop was not unlawfully extended. (R., pp.62-71; 9/4/19 Tr.,
p.84, L.16 – p.90, L.9.) Alternatively, the state argued that even if the stop was unlawfully
extended, the physical evidence was admissible under the inevitable discovery doctrine. (R.,
pp.71-74; 9/4/19 Tr., p.90, Ls.3-9.) The state also argued that Vivian’s post-Miranda statements
were admissible at trial because they were voluntarily made. (9/4/19 Tr., p.90, L.10 – p.91, L.4.)
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The district court denied the motion in part and granted it in part. (R., pp.79-87.) The court
concluded that Deputy Brott unlawfully extended the duration of the traffic stop by not delivering
the completed citation to Vivian for two and a half minutes. (R., pp.82-83.) However, the court
did not suppress the evidence discovered in Vivian’s car because it “would have inevitably been
discovered” by lawful means. (R., pp.83-85.) The court also did not suppress Vivian’s postMiranda statements because he had “not argued or presented evidence that his post-Miranda
statements were coerced.” (R., pp.85-86.) The court did, however, suppress Vivian’s pre-Miranda
statements concluding that they were obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. (R., pp.85-86.)
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Vivian pled guilty to possession of methamphetamine
reserving his right to appeal the district court’s rulings on his motion to suppress. (R., pp.88-103.)
The district court imposed a unified five-year sentence, with two years fixed, and placed Vivian
on probation for four years. (R., pp.108-10, 116-21.)
Vivian timely appeals. (R., pp.124-26.)

3

ISSUE
Vivian states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it declined to apply the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary
rule to suppress Mr. Vivian’s post-Miranda statements?
(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)
The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Vivian failed to show that the district court erred when it did not suppress his postMiranda statements?
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ARGUMENT
Vivian Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Denied His Motion To
Suppress
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Vivian asserts only that the district court erred when it refused to suppress his

post-Miranda statements. (Appellant’s brief, p.6.) Vivian argues that his post-Miranda statements
should have been suppressed as fruit of the unlawful extension because (1) the Miranda warning
“did not eliminate the taint of the officer’s Fourth Amendment violation,” and (2) the “State failed
to demonstrate that the statements were admissible under any exception to the exclusionary rule.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.6.)
Vivian has not shown that his post-Miranda should have been suppressed. Vivian’s postMiranda statements would have been inevitably discovered. Beyond that, the statements were
made voluntarily and were the product of a free will such that it purged the taint of any Fourth
Amendment violation. See State v. Yeates, 112 Idaho 377, 384, 732 P.2d 346, 353 (Ct. App.
1987).

B.

Standard Of Review
“The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision on a

motion to suppress is challenged, the Court accepts the trial court’s findings of fact that are
supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of constitutional principles
to the facts as found.” State v. Moore, 164 Idaho 379, 381, 430 P.3d 1278, 1280 (2018) (quoting
State v. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 103 P.3d 454, 456 (2004)).
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C.

The District Court Did Not Err When It Denied Vivian’s Motion To Suppress His PostMiranda Statements
Vivian’s post-Miranda statements were not subject to suppress under the exclusionary rule

because they would have been inevitably discovered. “The exclusionary rule is a judicially created
remedy for searches and seizures that violate the Constitution.” State v. Koivu, 152 Idaho 511,
518, 272 P.3d 483, 490 (2012). “The United States Supreme Court has articulated the three
exceptions” to the exclusionary rule, “independent origin, inevitable discovery, and attenuated
basis.” Stuart v. State, 136 Idaho 490, 495, 36 P.3d 1278, 1283 (2001). The question underlying
these exceptions “is whether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the evidence to
which instant objection is made has been come at by exploitation of that illegality or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.” Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (internal quotation omitted).
The inevitable discovery doctrine makes suppression of evidence improper where, even if
the evidence was actually obtained by constitutionally improper means, the prosecution establishes
by a preponderance of evidence that the evidence inevitably would have been found by lawful
means. Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984); Stuart, 136 Idaho at 497-98, 36 P.3d at 128586. The underlying rationale of this rule is that suppression should leave the prosecution in the
same position it would have been absent the police misconduct, not a worse one. Nix, 467 U.S. at
442-44; State v. Buterbaugh, 138 Idaho 96, 102, 57 P.3d 807, 813 (Ct. App. 2002).
The district court properly applied these standards to the evidence discovered in Vivian’s
car and concluded that it was admissible because it would have been inevitably discovered by
lawful means. (R., pp.83-85.) Like the physical evidence, Vivian’s statements about that evidence
would have been inevitably obtained as a result of Vivian’s lawful arrest.
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As a preliminary matter, the district court erroneously concluded that Deputy Brott’s
conversation with the two police officers about what to do with Vivian’s car contributed to the
unlawful extension of the stop. (R., pp.82-83.) According to the district court, Deputy Brott
“completed the purpose of the suspended license investigation” when he exited his patrol car with
the completed citation in hand, but then “delayed” delivering the citation for “nearly 2 and ½
minutes” in order to facilitate the dog sniff. (R., pp.82-83.) This conclusion is incorrect.
Deputy Brott testified that resolving what to do with a driver’s parked car is his usual
practice during the course of a traffic stop for driving without privileges. (6/7/19 Tr., p.13, Ls.1019.) Here, Deputy Brott discussed with the other officers what to do with Vivian’s car since it was
parked in a private area that was under construction. (R., p.80, n.4; 6/7/19 Tr., p.18, L.14 – p.19,
L.7; 9/4/19 Tr., p.30, L.16 – p.32, L.14.) Because Vivian’s driver’s license was suspended and the
car’s brake lights were inoperable, neither he nor anyone else could drive his car away from the
construction area where it was parked. (R., p.85.) Under these circumstances, discussing what to
do with the parked car was directly tied to the stop’s mission (i.e., the driving without privileges
investigation) and did not unlawfully extend the duration of the stop. It follows that any unlawful
delay consisted only of the time Deputy Brott spent speaking to Deputy Hickam after his arrival.2
In any event, the record reveals that even if Deputy Brott had proceeded directly to Vivian’s
car after completing the citation, Vivian would inevitably have made the same incriminating
statements.

Deputy Brott’s body cam footage shows that once he contacted Vivian after

completing the citation, it took several minutes to remove Vivian from his car, perform the
consented-to pat down search of Vivian’s person, ask him if he knew anyone who could pick up

2

During the suppression hearing, the prosecutor conceded that there was “an inappropriate
extension” of the stop for about fifty-five seconds when Deputy Brott spoke to Deputy Hickam
before issuing the completed citation to Vivian. (9/4/19 Tr., p.87, Ls.16-21, p.89, Ls.21-25.)
7

his vehicle, and to explain and issue the ticket to him. (Ex. A., 19:29 – 21:56.) Undoubtedly,
Deputy Hickam, whose assistance had been requested nearly ten minutes earlier, would have
arrived and deployed the drug-detection dog while these events were transpiring. (Ex. A, 18:36 –
18:46.)
The drug-detection dog’s inevitable alert would transform the nature of the stop into a drug
investigation and provide reasonable suspicion to continue Vivian’s detention while Deputy
Hickam searched the car. See State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873, 172 P.3d 1146, 1148 (Ct.
App. 2007) (“[W]hen a reliable drug-detection dog indicates that a lawfully stopped automobile
contains the odor of controlled substances, the officer has probable cause to believe that there are
drugs in the automobile and may search it without a warrant.”). As the district court correctly
concluded, the physical evidence would have been inevitably discovered (R., pp.83-85), and as a
result, Vivian would have been confronted with the same fruits of the search, albeit untainted by
any unlawfully extended seizure. Either way, Vivian would have inevitably made his statements
in response to being confronted with the evidence discovered in his car at roughly the same time,
in the same place, by the same law enforcement officers, and under almost identical circumstances.
Because the statements would have been inevitably discovered, the district court did not err when
it denied Vivian’s motion to suppress his post-Miranda statements. Vivian has failed to show
otherwise.
Vivian argues that the Miranda warning “did not dissipate the taint of the illegal seizure,
and [his] statements should have been suppressed as fruit of the poisonous tree, absent a showing
by the State that an exception to the exclusionary rule applied.” (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-9.) Vivian
is correct that a Miranda warning alone cannot always dissipate the taint of the illegal seizure.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975) (holding Miranda warnings “alone and per se, cannot
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always make the act [of confessing] sufficiently a product of free will to break, for Fourth
Amendment purposes, the causal connection between the illegality and the confession.”). 3
However, Vivian’s argument fails under further scrutiny.
“[U]nlike physical evidence, a statement can be the untainted product of a free will.”
Yeates, 112 Idaho at 383, 732 P.2d at 352. Thus, the causal chain between any Fourth Amendment
violation and voluntary statements subsequently made may be broken if the voluntary statements
were “‘sufficiently an act of free will to purge the primary taint.’” Brown, 422 U.S. at 601-02
(1975) (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 486); Yeates, 112 Idaho at 383, 732 P.2d at 352. “The
question whether a confession is the product of a free will under Wong Sun must be answered by
the facts of each case.” Brown, 422 U.S. at 603.
The relevant factors for determining whether incriminating statements are admissible
despite a constitutional violation include (1) whether Miranda warnings were given and the
statements voluntarily made, (2) the temporal proximity of the unlawful police conduct and the
confession, (3) the purpose and flagrancy of the misconduct, and (4) whether intervening
circumstances broke the causal chain between the illegal police conduct and the statements.
Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-04; Yeates, 112 Idaho at 383-84, 732 P.2d at 352-53. Applying the factors
in this case shows that Vivian’s post-Miranda statements were the product of a free will such that
the Miranda warning dissipated the taint of the illegal seizure.

3

The Idaho Court of Appeals explained, that “[e]ven though the making of statements invokes
fifth amendment principles, the fourth amendment is nonetheless offended when verbal evidence
is the ‘fruit’ obtained from an illegal search or seizure.” Yeates, 112 Idaho at 383, 732 P.2d at 352
(citing Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 471). In other words, “[a] finding that the statements were voluntary
under the fifth amendment does not dispose of the fourth amendment issue.” Id. (citing Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975)).
9

Vivian’s post-Miranda statements were voluntarily made. After being handcuffed and
placed in the back of Deputy Brott’s patrol vehicle, Vivian was read his Miranda rights. (Ex. A,
26:55 – 29:19.) At the time, Vivian acknowledged that he understood his rights, and he has never
since claimed that his subsequent statements were involuntary. (Ex. A, 28:57 – 29:01.) Indeed,
the district court refused to suppress his post-Miranda statements precisely because Vivian did not
challenge the voluntariness of his statements. (R., pp.85-86.) Thus, the threshold factor is met
and favors the admissibility of Vivian’s incriminating post-Miranda statements.
With regard to the second factor, Vivian made the post-Miranda statements while sitting
handcuffed in the back Deputy Brott’s patrol car approximately sixteen and a half minutes after
Deputy Brott exited his patrol car with the completed citation. (Ex. A, 16:46, 33:25-38:22.) In
the relatively short time that elapsed between the brief unlawful detention and Vivian’s statements,
Vivian sat on the front bumper of Deputy Brott’s patrol car as Deputy Hickam searched his car.
(Ex. A, 22:35 – 26:55.) He was not handcuffed. (Id.) He spoke casually with Deputy Brott about
where he was coming from and where he lived, and asked about the drug detection canine’s breed.
(Id.) At one point he even laughed. (Ex. A, 24:40 – 25:20.) The congenial atmosphere
surrounding his detention outweighs the relatively short period of time that elapsed between the
unlawful extension and Vivian’s statements. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 108 (1980)
(holding that the second Brown factor weighed in favor of admission because the congenial nature
of the defendant’s detention outweighed the time that elapsed between the initiation of the
detention and the petitioner’s admissions.) Even if the second factor favors suppression, it is
“generally considered to be of little or no use in the balancing of the Brown factors.” Yeates, 112
Idaho at 384, 732 P.2d at 353.
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The third factor also favors admissibility. Because Vivian’s driver’s license was suspended
and the car’s brake lights were inoperable, neither he nor anyone else could drive his car away
from the stop. (R., p.85). The state has maintained that the time Deputy Brott spent discussing
what to do with Vivian’s car did not unlawfully extend the duration of the stop as it was directly
tied to the stop’s mission.

For the same reason, his conduct does not constitute flagrant

misconduct. Likewise, to the extent Deputy Brott deviated from the mission of the traffic stop by
speaking to Deputy Hickam, such a mistake was a misjudgment, but it was not flagrant misconduct.
Deputy Brott testified that he simply “wanted to explain” the circumstances of the stop to Deputy
Hickam. (9/4/19 Tr., p.33, L.8 – p.34, L.21.) Because the Deputy’s conduct was not purposeful
or flagrant, the third factor also favors admission.
Finally, probable cause to arrest Vivian arose subsequent to any unlawful delay. Probable
cause to arrest is an intervening circumstance that breaks the causal chain between the illegal police
conduct and any subsequent statements. See Yeates, 112 Idaho at 384, 732 P.2d at 353 (citing
United States v. Maier, 720 F.2d 978 (8th Cir. 1983); United States v. Manuel, 706 F.2d 908 (9th
Cir. 1983)). Here, Deputy Hickam’s drug-detection dog alerted to the presence of drugs in
Vivian’s vehicle before Vivian was Mirandized. (R. p.81.) Deputy Hickam’s subsequent search
of Vivian’s car uncovered a baggie of methamphetamine and a glass pipe providing probable cause
to arrest Vivian for possession of a controlled substance and drug paraphernalia before Vivian
made the incriminating statements. (6/7/19 Tr., p.25, Ls.4-14.) On balance the factors that
Vivian’s post-Miranda statements were the product of a free will such that the Miranda warning
dissipated the taint of the illegal seizure.
Moreover, Vivian’s argument relies primarily on three cases: State v. Downing, 163 Idaho
26, 407 P.3d 1285 (2017) (holding statements in response to questioning about drugs obtained
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because of unlawful pat-down not attenuated), State v. Bills, 166 Idaho 778, 463 P.3d 412 (Ct.
App. 2020) (holding statements that are “the result of being confronted, … with evidence form an
illegal search” should be suppressed) and State v. Luna, 126 Idaho 235, 880 P.2d 265 (Ct. App.
1994) (holding statements that are the “result of being confronted … with the fruits of an illegal
search” should be suppressed). (Appellant’s brief, pp.6-9.) These cases are not controlling
because they do not address an illegal seizure, as in this case. Here there was no illegal search,
and therefore no confrontation with illegally obtained evidence. Statements are admissible where
the state carries its burden of proving an exception to the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
Downing, 163 Idaho at 30-31, 407 P.3d 1289-90; Bills, 166 Idaho at ___, 463 P.3d at 413-16;
Luna, 126 Idaho at 238-39, 880 P.2d at 268-69. Here, unlike the cases relied on by Vivian, the
state has carried its burden to prove that Vivian’s statements were inevitably discoverable and thus
not subject to suppression as fruit of the poisonous tree.
In sum, Vivian’s statements would have been inevitably discovered and were sufficiently
the product of a free will so as to purge the taint of any unlawful seizure. For these reasons the
district court did not err when it did not suppress Vivian’s post-Miranda statements. Vivian has
failed to show otherwise.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the judgment of the district court.
DATED this 11th day of January, 2021.

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of January, 2021, served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to the attorney listed below by means of iCourt
File and Serve:
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us

/s/ Justin R. Porter
JUSTIN R. PORTER
Deputy Attorney General
JRP/dd
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